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Chandler v. Florida: Cameras, Courts,
and the Constitution
The rising importance of television journalism in the 1960's has resulted
in the Supreme Court deciding whether a criminal defendant's due process
rights are violated by camera coverage of the courtroom proceeding. The
decision of Chandler v. Florida clearly provides the answer; for unless a
defendant proves prejudice with specificity, the Constitution does not ban
televised criminal trials. The author examines the issues with a revealing
historical perspective. He then traces the Court's factual and legal analy-
sis and concludes that the decision will serve to offer the states guidance in
deciding whether to implement a program allowing television coverage of
its trials.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was Justice Clark who wrote that:
[A] responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its func-
tion in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over
several centuries. The press does not simply publish information about
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the po-
lice, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. This Court has, therefore, been unwilling to place any direct
limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news media for
"[w] hat transpires in the court room is public property."1
While the Court has been most sensitive to the first amend-
ment 2 rights of the "print media" in the reporting of courtroom
proceedings, 3 that same sensitivity has not been extended to the
1. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
2. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The first amendment is made applicable to the states by section one of the four-
teenth amendment, which reads, in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (dis-
cussing press access to the courtroom). For a further discussion see Zimmerman,
Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for the Constitu-
tional Protection of the News Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 642 (1980). See
also note 128 infra.
electronic media,4 although this disparity is rapidly changing.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Chandler v.
Florida5 is likely to serve as an impetus to continued experimen-
tation and, perhaps, will lead to implementation of electronic me-
dia coverage of courtroom proceedings nationwide. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Chandler Court, held that it is consistent
with constitutional guarantees 6 for a state to allow radio, televi-
sion and still photographic coverage of criminal trials for public
broadcast, notwithstanding the objection of the defendant.
The purpose of this note is to present, first, an historical per-
spective leading up to Chandler. Secondly, the Supreme Court's
reasoning and rationale in refusing to accept 7 or announce a per
se constitutional rule that all photographic or broadcast coverage
of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process of law will
be analyzed. Thirdly, the impact of the case and questions that
remain unanswered will be considered.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Position of the American Bar Association
Prior to 1937, a number of cases 8 received such extensive news
media coverage that interference with courtroom proceedings ran
rampant, and the setting was totally inappropriate for conducting
a trial. This prompted 9 the American Bar Association (A.B.A.)
House of Delegates,lO in 1937, to adopt Judicial Canon 35, which
4. Unless the context requires otherwise, "electronic media" shall be used as
a generic term which encompasses television, film, video tape cameras, still pho-
tography cameras, tape recording devices, and radio broadcasting equipment.
5. 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981).
6. The petitioners argued that electronic media coverage of their trial de-
prived them of their right to due process and a fair trial. Thus, Chandler does not
represent a first amendment controversy.
7. Appellants argued that Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1964), announced a per
se constitutional rule that televising criminal trials is inherently a denial of due
process. However, Chief Justice Burger writes in Chandler that the Estes decision
was only a plurality, with Justice Harlan providing the fifth vote necessary in sup-
port of the judgment, and that Justice Harlan limited his holding to the facts in
Estes. 101 S. Ct. at 808-09.
8. See, e.g., State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 649 (1935). This case involved the sensationalized trial of Bruno
Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of the infant son of Charles A.
Lindbergh. See note 9 infra for sources which expand upon the factors which in-
stigated the A.B.A. prohibition.
9. For a detailed history, see Kieblowicz, The Story Behind the Adoption of
the Ban on Courtroom Cameras, 63 JuD. 14 (1979). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1976) (discussing the trial of Bruno Hauptmann);
S. WHIPPLE, THE TRIAL OF BRUNO RIcHARD HAurMANN 46-49 (1937).
10. The A.B.A. House of Delegates is the policy making body of the American
Bar Association.
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banned1' all photographic and broadcasting equipment from the
courtroom.12 Almost every state adopted the substance of the Ca-
non at its inception.13 In 1952, a special committee of the A.B.A.
produced a report that caused the House of Delegates to amend
Canon 35 to prohibit the televising of court proceedings as well.14
The Canon's interdiction was reaffirmed in 1972, when the Code of
Judicial Conduct replaced the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and Ca-
non 3A(7) superseded Canon 35.15 However, as amended, Canon
3A(7) does allow the admission of television cameras into the
courtroom for selective and limited purposes, such as use in edu-
11. For the legal effect of such a ban, see note 20 infra and accompanying text.
12. American Bar Association, Canons of Judicial Ethics, 62 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
1123, 1134-35 (1937). As adopted on September 30, 1937, Judicial Canon 35 reads:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and deco-
rum. The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the
court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court pro-
ceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the pro-
ceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect
thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
A complete summary of the history of Canon 35 is contained in the appendix to
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 596 (1964)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
13. By the time Estes v. Texas was decided in 1964, all but two states, Texas
and Colorado, had adopted what was then Canon 35, thereby prohibiting television
in the courtroom. 381 U.S. at 544.
14. American Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Televising
and Broadcasting Legislative and Judicial Proceedings, 77 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 607,
607 (1952).
15. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 56-59
(1973). Canon 3A(7) reads as follows:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, television, recording or taking
photographs in the courtroom during sessions of court or recesses be-
tween sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of
evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for the purposes of judicial
administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing of investi-
gative, ceremonial or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of ap-
propriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair
the dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted
or recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the record-
ing and repoduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceed-
ing has been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional pur-
poses in educational institutions.
ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 3A(7) (1973).
cational settings and for certain experiments. 16
In August, 1977, the A.B.A. Adjunct Committee on Fair Trial-
Free Press began a study to reevaluate and assess the standards
relating to fair trials and freedom of the press. A proposal of new
standards was released by the committee in early 1978. Those
standards included a provision allowing courtroom coverage by
electronic media, under conditions to be established by local rule
or by agreement with representatives of the news media, pro-
vided such coverage could be implemented unobtrusively and
without affecting the conduct of the trial.17 The language made
certain that no right of access by electronic media was created by
the standard; the right of access was left to the sound discretion
of the trial court, absent the formulation of a general policy by the
highest court of the jurisdiction.' 8
On March 22, 1978, the Standing Committee on American Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice favorably recommended the adjunct
committee's proposed standard. After consideration, the Commit-
tee on Criminal Justice and the Media referred the proposal to
the Council of Criminal Justice with the suggestion that it en-
dorse the proposed electronic media standard. Despite these two
previous favorable recommendations by committee, the Council
of the Section of Criminal Justice, by vote, declined to support the
proposed measure in April, 1978. The Committee on Association
Standards for Criminal Justice accumulated the comments of
each reviewing body and presented all of the Fair Trial-Free
Press standards to the A.B.A. House of Delegates. At the A.B.A.
midwinter meeting, in February, 1979, the House of Delegates re-
viewed and rejected the proposed standard for electronic media
coverage of court proceedings. 19
It must be noted that Canon 3A(7) "has of itself no binding ef-
fect on the courts but merely expresses the view of the Associa-
tion in opposition to the broadcasting, televising, and
photographing of court proceedings."20 Since the original adop-
tion of what is now Canon 3A(7) in 1937, and for the three de-
16. See note 15 supra.
17. Proposed Standard 8-3.6(a) (tentative draft) of the ABA HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES, PROCEEDINGS ANNUAL MEETING, Report No. 108 (Aug. 1978) stated in perti-
nent part: "Television, radio and photographic coverage of judicial proceedings is
not per se inconsistent with the right to a fair trial." For the full text, see ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES, 8.5
(1980).
18. See note 17 supra.
19. A.B.A. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, PROCEEDINGS MIDYEAR MEETINGS, Report No.
109 (Feb. 1979). Apparently, the reasons for declining to support the proposed
measure were much the same as those disclosed by the Court in Estes. Those rea-
sons will be discussed throughout this note.
20. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 535 (1965).
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cades following, major disputes over press recordation of trials
were rare.21 However, the impact of the Canon should not be un-
derstated, for by the time Estes v. Texas 22 was decided in 1964, all
states but Texas and Colorado had adopted what was then A.B.A.
Canon 35, thereby prohibiting electronic media coverage in the
courtroom.
23
The federal judiciary reacted to the concern for disruptive influ-
ence allegedly caused by electronic media in the courtrooms by
enacting a federal rule banning still cameras and radio from fed-
eral trials.24 In 1962, a resolution of the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence expanded the Rule 53 mandate to bar television cameras
from all federal courts and from the courtroom surroundings. 25
Thus, in essence, the A.B.A. Canon was followed by the federal
judiciary, along with most of the sovereign states.
The primary reason for the A.B.A. prohibition in 1937 was that
the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the public's
right to be informed through the photographic medium.26 Elec-
tronic broadcasting and still cameras were loud, conspicuous, and
obtrusive. Proponents of the prohibition argued that the potential
for disruption of courtroom proceedings would interfere with the
dignity and decorum of the trial process and risk prejudice to the
defendant.27 Witness testimony and juror attentiveness would
suffer from the distractions and the cognizance of being photo-
graphed.28 Furthermore, there was the opinion that the edited
versions of the trial released to the public would influence jurors
to return verdicts to satisfy public sentiments.29 It was thought
that electronic media coverage of trial proceedings would create
unique problems and time consuming tasks for the trial court ju-
21. See Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 679. The reason such disputes were in-
frequent appears to be due in large part to the adoption of what is now Canon
3A(7) by the A.B.A.
22. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
23. Id. at 544.
24. FED. R. CraM. P. 53 provides: "The taking of photographs in the courtroom
during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial pro-
ceedings from the courtroom shall not be permitted by the court."
25. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORTS OF THE PROCEEDING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 9-
10 (1962).
26. American Bar Association, Special Committee on Cooperation Between the
Press, Radio and Bar Report, 62 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 851, 853 (1937).
27. Id. at 864.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 857-58.
diciary, such as having to conduct an extensive voir dire regard-
ing juror attitude toward television and possibly requiring the
court to sequester the jury.30 The A.B.A.'s Special Committee on
Televising and Broadcasting Legislative and Judicial Proceedings
expressed a concern that electronic media reports of sensational
trials might even have an "injurious effect on public morals."31
Whether the aforementioned reasons 32 are persuasive has trig-
gered much debate33 and criticism, 34 but, to date, the A.B.A. has
not displaced or revised Canon 3A(7).35
B. The Position of the Judiciary
Largely because of the American Bar Association's long stand-
ing electronic media prohibition, litigated disputes over electronic
press coverage were rare. However, in the 1960's, television jour-
30. See Whisenand, Florida's Experience with Cameras in the Courtroom, 64
A.B.A.J. 1860, 1863 (1978).
31. 77 A.B-A. REP. 607, 610 (1952):
The experience thus far with radio broadcasting and motion pictures of
trials has shown that only the most sordid crimes are likely to be tele-
vised. In addition, the undue publicity from the telecasting of criminals
may pander to the desire of abnormal criminal minds for mock heroics
and resulting fame. To sensationalize such trials by television can have
but an injurious effect on public morals.
For a further discussion in this area, see generally Zimmerman, supra note 3;
Tornquist, Television in the Courtroom: Devil or Saint?, 17 WILAMETrE L. REV. 345
(1981).
32. The aforementioned reasons for the electronic media prohibition is by no
means complete but is intended merely to serve as an indicator of the issues
raised. For a further discussion, see Zimmerman, supra note 3 at 672-98; Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532; In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla.
1979).
33. See Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 672-79.
34. In Oklahoma, a defendant sought to reverse a conviction because of the
psychological impact of television on his trial. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1958). Affirming the conviction, the appellate court discussed the total
absence of evidence of such an impact and therefore criticized the earlier version
of A.B.A. Canon 3A(7): 'This contention presents itself as a baseless boogey con-
structed out of pure conjecture. We are of the opinion that the presumption upon
which Canon 35 has been constructed is fabricated out of sheer implication and
not hammered out on the anvil of experience." Id. at 742. See Hearings Concern-
ing Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 595, 296 P.2d 465, 468
(1956) (Justice Moore of the Colorado Supreme Court states his thoughts on and
experiences with electronic media in the courtroom); see also Zimmerman, supra
note 3, at 685-87.
35. The American Bar Association President, William Reece Smith, Jr., was
quoted after Chandler as saying he still had "grave reservations" about whether
television could provide "much useful information in 15-second spots in evening
news" coverage of court proceedings. See Winter, Cameras in the Courtroom, 67
A.B.A.J. 277 (1981). But Donald Fretz, chairman of the A.B.A. Adjunct Committee
on Fair Trial-Free Press in Criminal Law Issues, said that his committee is consid-
ering the need to review A.B.A. Standard 8-3.6, relating to 'The Rights of Fair Trial
and Free Press," to allow televised coverage of trials. Id. at 279.
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nalism came of age.36 The result was that a number of cases in-
volving an allegation of prejudice to the defendant, because of the
broadcast media, came before the United States Supreme Court.37
One such case, the first decided prior to Estes, alluded to a suspi-
cion that broadcast publicity held a peerless potential for
prejudice. In that case, Rideau v. Louisiana,38 a defendant
charged with armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder was inter-
rogated, while in jail, by the parish sheriff, and, in front of televi-
sion cameras, the accused admitted perpetration of the crimes.
The filmed "interview" was broadcast several times and widely
viewed throughout the parish. The trial judge denied a defense
motion for change of venue, and the defendant was accordingly
convicted and sentenced to death.3 9 The Supreme Court held that
the televised confession presumptively violated the defendant's
due process rights, even though the defendant could not demon-
strate precisely how the publicity influenced his conviction. 40
The debate over electronic media coverage heightened. On the
one side, it was argued that to allow the presence of the broadcast
media throughout the trial would detract from the dignity of the
courtroom, psychologically affect the participants, prejudice the
defendant, and create public misconceptions of the legal pro-
cess.4 1 On the other side, it was contended that refusal of the
broadcasting privilege was a denial of both the right to a public
36. For a discussion of the rising importance of television news, see HERMAN
W. LAND ASSOCIATES, TELEVISION AND THE WIRD CITY: A STUDY OF THE IMPLICA-
TIONS OF A CHANGE IN THE MODE OF TRANSMISSION (1968); Hardin, The TV. News
Explosion, SATURDAY REVIEW, Feb. 11, 1967, at 72.
A recent Gallup Poll estimated that the average American spends 46% of his or
her leisure time watching television as compared with 14% of leisure time spent
reading. GALLUP OPINION INDEX, REP. No. 105 (1974).
37. See Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 679.
38. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
39. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 242 La.
431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1961).
40. Justice Stewart, in referring to the defendant's trial, stated: "Any subse-
quent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a specta-
cle could be but a hallow formality." Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
The Justice continued: "[W]e do not hesitate to hold ... that due process of law
in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who
had not seen and heard Rideau's televised 'interview.'" Id. at 727.
41. See generally Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MT.
L. REV. 1 (1960); Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Professiom Canon 35
Should Not Be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A.J. 615 (1962); Warden, Canon 35: Is There
Room For Objectivity?, 4 WASHBURN .J. 211, 212 (1965).
trial42 and freedom of the press.43
This issue was initially faced by the United States Supreme
Court in Estes v. Texas," in 1964. However, the Court limited its
review to the question of whether requiring petitioner (the de-
fendant at trial), over his continuing objection, to submit to a live
telecast and broadcast of his trial45 denied him due process of law
and equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amend-
ment.46 Because the judgment created only a plurality,47 it is nec-
essary to give a brief review of each of the six separate opinions.48
Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, pronounced that the ac-
tions of the media constituted a denial of due process, even in the
absence of a showing of specific prejudice.49 In other words, the
use of telev'ision during criminal trials was inherently prejudicial
and in itself constituted a violation of the fourteenth amend-
42. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
43. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
44. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The defendant was convicted of swindling by the Dis-
trict Court for the Seventh Judicial District of Texas at Tyler. The conviction was
affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Certiorari was granted by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
45. The broadcast coverage of Estes's trial was limited. Pretrial motions were
covered in full by the defense for the exclusion of cameras and recording devices
and for a continuance. Id. at 535-36. During the trial, the court permitted televi-
sion personnel to make live broadcasts of the state's opening and closing argu-
ments, even though mechanical difficulties blanked out the visual portion of the
coverage of the opening, and of the return of the verdict. The court did not permit
coverage of defense summations. During the actual trial, videotapes, but no sound
recordings, were permitted. Id. at 537, n.2.
A booth, painted to blend with the walls, had been constructed at the back of
the courtroom in order to conceal all television and newsreel cameras. An aper-
ture gave the lenses an unrestricted view. Id. at 537.
46. Id. at 534-35.
47. Justice Clark spoke for the Court and was joined by Justices Warren,
Douglas, and Goldberg in a separate concurrence. Justice Harlan provided the
fifth vote necessary in support of the judgment by a separate concurrence. Mr.
Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Black, Brennan, and White joined, dissented.
48. This article is not intended to present a complete factual scenario and
analysis of the Estes Court, but merely poses to summarily discuss the case so as
to provide the reader with a general understanding of the issue(s) and how each
Justice viewed the presence of electronic media in the courtroom at that time.
However, Estes should not be disregarded as insignificant in the development of
the law leading up to Chandler, for its impact was far reaching in the media-court-
room debate. For an extensive and precise analysis of Estes and a discussion of
the case's impact and shortcomings, see Zimmerman, supra note 3. See also Re-
cent Cases, Constitutional Law-Televising of Criminal Trials Held Violative of the
Right to a Fair Trial 18 VAND. L. REV. 20-49 (1965).
49. 381 U.S. 532, 542, 544, 550 (1965). See Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 680-82
for a discussion of presumptive prejudicial publicity in the area of the law.
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ment.50 The Justice expressly recognized the sixth amendment
right of the accused to a "public" trial. He also insisted that free-
dom of the press, as granted by the first amendment, must neces-
sarily be subject to the maintenance of fairness in the judicial
process, and that permitting electronic media within the court-
room would inevitably prejudice the trial.51
In support of this proposition, Justice Clark commented on the
potential psychological impact of the electronic media upon the
trial participants. 52 He believed that jurors would be influenced
by the publicity and distracted during the proceedings. "[Wit-
nesses] may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and
given to overstatement; memories may falter.., and accuracy of
statement may be severely undermined." 53 In addition, Justice
Clark felt the trial judge would be burdened with the supervisory
task of controlling media crews. Furthermore, for a judge that is
elected, the presence of the electronic media could bring the trial
into the political arena by affording the judge the maximum possi-
ble publicity.54 He continued that there would be an unerring
50. Justice Clark specified that:
the chief function of our judicial machinery is to ascertain the truth. The
use of television, however, cannot be said to contribute materially to this
objective. Rather its use amounts to the injection of an irrelevant factor
into court proceedings. In addition experience teaches that there are nu-
merous situations in which it might cause actual unfairness-some so
subtle as to defy detection by the accused or control by the judge.
381 U.S. at 544-45 (1965). He continued with a host of specific reasons to prohibit
electronic media coverage and thus justified what in his mind dictated a presump-
tion of prejudice.
51. Id. at 539. In understanding the task of Justice Clark in grappling with the
freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial, the words of Justice Black should
be considered: "free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies
of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them." Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) (a free speech and fair trial case).
For a discussion of this conflict, see generally Note, Public Trials and a First
Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of Openness, 60 NEBRASKA L REV. 169
(1981).
52. 381 U.S. at 545.
53. Id. at 547.
54. Chief Justice Warren cited a clear example of just such an instance in his
concurring opinion. In his example, a trial judge made the following speech:
' is case is not being tried under the Federal Constitution. The De-
fendant has been brought into this Court under the state laws, under the
State Constitution. ...
I took an oath to uphold this Constitution; not the Federal Constitution
but the State Constitution; and I am going to do my best to do that as long
as I preside in this Court, and if it is distasteful in following my oath and
upholding the constitution, it will just have to be distasteful.'
Id. at 566 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice commented on the grand-
psychological impact on the accused, 55 along with the potential
for depriving him of effective counsel.56
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Clark hesitated to deal with
the potential for "future developments in the field of electron-
ics."5 7 He limited his holding to television in its present stage of
technological development, clearly appreciating the possibility
"that the ever advancing techniques of public communication and
the adjustment of the public to its presence may bring about a
change in the effect of telecasting upon the fairness of criminal
trials."58
It was with this hesitation that the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Warren, joined by Justices Goldberg and Douglas, dis-
agreed. The Chief Justice wrote: "IF] or the Constitution to have
vitality, this Court must be able to apply its principles to situa-
tions that may not have been foreseen at the time those princi-
ples were adopted."59 The Justices felt that to permit electronic
media coverage of federal and state court trials would invariably
violate the sixth and fourteenth amendments.60 Basically, three
justifications were presented for this posture. The first was the
notion that electronic media coverage of trials would detract from
the dignity and integrity of the courtroom process with the result
being a public misconception of the judicial system.61 The second
was the inescapable psychological impact upon trial partici-
standing as follows: "One is entitled to wonder if such a statement would be made
in a court of justice by any state trial judge except as an appeal calculated to gain
the favor of his viewing audience." Id.
55. In fact the Justice likened the presence of television to "a form of mental-
if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree." Id.
at 549.
56. 'The distractions land] intrusions into confidential attorney-client rela-
tionships, and the temptation offered by television to play to the public audience
might often have a direct effect not only upon the lawyers, but the judge, jury and
the witnesses." Id.
57. Id. at 552.
58. Id. at 551-52. It can perhaps be inferred that when the Court heard argu-
ment on November 12, 1980, on the case of Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct. 802
(1981), the future developments in the electronics field that Justice Clark envi-
sioned had come to pass.
59. 381 U.S. at 564 (Warren, CJ., concurring). It was reasoned that regardless
of the advancement of the electronic media in future years, it should not be al-
lowed into the courtroom during a criminal trial. Id.
60. Id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
61. 'The televising of trials would cause the public to equate the trial process
with the forms of entertainment regularly seen on television and with the com-
mercial objectives of the television industry." Id. at 571 (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring). 'There would be a real threat to the integrity of the trial process if the
television industry and trial judges were allowed to become partners in the stag-
ing of criminal proceedings." Id. at 573-74 (Warren, C.l., concurring).
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pants.62 Third, the television industry would select certain cases
because of their sensationalism, and this "singling out" would
subject certain defendants to a trial under prejudicial conditions
not experienced by others. As an example, the Chief Justice
wrote: "[T]he alleged perpetrator of the sensational murder, the
fallen idol, or some other person who, like petitioner, has at-
tracted the public interest would find his trial turned into a vehi-
cle for television."63
Because of these aforementioned reasons, the three Justices di-
agnosed television in the courtroom as inherently unfair and
ruled that, both now and in the future, its presence would be nec-
essarily inconsistent with what a trial should be. Stated simply,
the Justices required a per se rule that criminal trials should
never be televised.64 In summarizing, Chief Justice Warren cate-
gorized television as
one of the great inventions of all time and [able to] perform a large and
useful role in society. But the television camera, like other technological
innovations, is not entitled to pervade the lives of everyone in disregard of
constitutionally protected rights. The television industry, like other insti-
tutions, has a proper area of activities and limitations beyond which it
cannot go with its cameras. That area does not extend into an American
courtroom. On entering that hallowed sanctuary, where the lives, liberty
and property of people are in jeopardy, television representatives have
only the rights of the general public, namely, to be present, to observe the
proceedings, and thereafter, if they choose, to report them. 6 5
It was with Justice Harlan's concurrence that the majority
split.6 6 Arguably, this split takes on a clearer focus in regard to
precedent. While the other four Justices opted for the adoption of
a per se constitutional prohibition to electronic media coverage of
trials, Justice Harlan adopted a less expansive approach, holding
only that the presence of television cameras in a "criminal trial of
great notoriety" per se violated the fundamental right to a fair
trial assured by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.67 Justice Harlan appreciated and essentially agreed with
62. Here, the Justices differed little from the reasoning of Justice Clark. See
notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
63. 381 U.S. at 576-77 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See, e.g., Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (Dr. Sam Sheppard was convicted of murdering his wife
after a trial which was described as having a "carnival atmosphere"). Id. at 358.
64. 381 U.S. at 540-41.
65. Id. at 585-86 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
66. See note 47 supra.
67. 381 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring). He chose to refrain from deciding
the question of the use of television in less sensationalized trials until the appro-
priate case should arise, by stating the following:
his four brethren concerning the potential evils of the electronic
media's presence in the courthouse and felt "the arguments ad-
vanced against the constitutional banning of televised trials" to be
"peculiarly unpersuasive." 68 He concluded by saying: "at the
present juncture I can only conclude that televised trials, at least
in cases like this one,69 possess such capabilities for interfering
with the even course of the judicial process that they are constitu-
tionally banned."70
In the sixteen or so years since Estes was decided, only two
Supreme Court cases 71 have addressed the problems regarding
the use of modern electronic news gathering technology.72
Neither case involved the use of cameras in court proceedings. 73
Notwithstanding the lack of significant Supreme Court guidance
as to constitutional permissibility, more than half the states have
recently relaxed their rules, either on a permanent or experimen-
tal basis.74
When the issue of television in a non-notorious trial is presented it may
appear that no workable distinction can be drawn based on the type of
case involved, or that the possibilities for prejudice, though less severe,
are nonetheless of constitutional proportions. [citations omitted] The
resolution of those further questions should await an appropriate case; the
Court should proceed only step by step in this unplowed field. The opin-
ion of the Court necessarily goes no farther, for only the four members of
the majority who unreservedly join the Court's opinion would resolve
those questions now.
Id. at 590-91.
68. Id. at 594 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. The Justice was referring to notorious trials.
70. Id. at 596 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. That is excluding Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981). However, sev-
eral lower courts have concluded that televised coverage of a criminal trial is not a
per se denial of a defendant's right to due process. In none of these cases did the
courts interpret Estes as imposing a per se constitutional ban on the televising of
state criminal trials. See Bradley v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1972); Gonzales v.
People, 165 Colo. 322, 438 P.2d 686 (1968).
72. Hochins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (refused to allow broadcaster ac-
cess to a jail); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (holding
that there is no constitutional right to have either live or taped testimony recorded
and broadcast). For a discussion of these cases with the first amendment argu-
ments presented, see Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 651-53.
73. Nor did either case clarify or elaborate on the post-Estes uncertainty about
a potential first amendment right of technological access. Id. at 651.
74. An accurate list of those states that permit television and other electronic
media coverage either permanently or experimentally is difficult to compile be-
cause many states are currently in a phase of transition in this regard. As com-
piled in a recent article, Comment, Television in the Courtroom: Devil or Saint?.
17 WnLLAMETrE L. REv. 345, 347 (1981), the following states permit television
coverage:
Alabama* allows television coverage of all courts with the consent of par-
ties, witnesses and jurors.
Alaska allows coverage in trial courts and the state supreme court with
the consent of witnesses, parties and jurors.
Arizona allows coverage of appellate proceedings subject to the judge's
discretion. Consent of participants is not necessary.
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One such state is Florida. In 1975, the Florida Supreme Court
instituted an experimental program of courtroom television cover-
California has recently opened trial and appellate courts to experimental
coverage. A special committee on courts and the media commenced an in-
tensive study in June 1980, to determine the effects of television coverage
on trial participants' behavior.
Colorado* never adopted the A.B.A. Canon. It adopted its own rule which
allows coverage in all courts with the judge's consent and in the absence
of a participant's objection.
Florida* allows television in all courts without the parties' objection.
Georgia* allows coverage in appellate proceedings with consent of the
parties.
Idaho allows coverage of appellate proceedings with consent of the
parties.
Iowa allows coverage, but permits the judge to exclude cameras if a wit-
ness can show "good cause."
Louisiana allows coverage in- one district with the consent of the
participants.
Maryland on November 10, 1980, authorized an 18-month experiment with
broadcast coverage on both trial and appellate court proceedings.
Minnesota allows coverage of appellate proceedings without consent of
the parties.
Montana allows coverage of courts, but the presiding judge may deny cov-
erage if the reasons for doing so are stated.
Nevada* allows coverage in all courts in the absence of objection by a
participant.
New Hampshire* allows coverage of supreme court and some trial pro-
ceedings without consent of the participants.
New Jersey allows coverage in two counties on an experimental basis.
New York* recently adopted a rule permitting coverage of appellate court
proceedings.
North Dakota allows coverage in the state supreme court without consent
of the participants.
Ohio allowed experimental coverage from June 1978 to June 1979.
Oklahoma allows coverage of trial and appellate courts with the consent
of the judge in all cases and the consent of the defendant in criminal
cases.
Pennsylvania allows the judge to authorize televising of any trial court
nonjury civil proceeding except divorce or custody proceedings. No wit-
ness or party who objects can be photographed.
Tennessee allows televising of trial and appellate proceedings.
Texas* allows appellate coverage.
Washington* allows coverage of trial and appellate courts with the con-
sent of all participants.
West Virginia allows coverage in one county with the consent of the
parties.
Wisconsin allows coverage in selected proceedings but denies coverage if
a party requests exclusion of the media unless the media can show that
the participant's reason for not desiring coverage is not valid.
States marked with an asterick (*) have adopted a permanent rule. See NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, RuLEs CONCERNING TELEVISION, RADIO AND
PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, SUMMARY TABLE (rev. March
24, 1980). See also In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 782-91
(Fla. 1979); Graves, Cameras in the Courts: The Situation Today, 63 JUD. 24, 25-27
(1979); Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 645 n.21 (for a more detailed compilation).
177
age75 under the mandate of specific guidelines. 76 These initial
guidelines, among other things, required the consent of all parties
to the action. It developed, in practice, however, that the parties
usually refused to agree to such electronic coverage. Neverthe-
less, it was the view of the court that an experimental period dur-
ing which trials would be conducted with electronic media
coverage was essential to a reasoned decision on the petition 77 for
modification of Canon 3A(7). Consequently, the court then sup-
plemented its rule and established a new one year experimental
program, which permitted the electronic media to cover all judi-
cial proceedings without reference to the consent of the parties,
but still retained certain implementation guidelines. 78 When the
experimental period concluded, the Florida Supreme Court re-
viewed briefs, reports, letters of comment and studies and sur-
veyed witnesses, jurors, attorneys, and court personnel. The
court also conducted a separate survey of judges and reviewed
the experiences of other states that had adopted, either experi-
mentally or permanently, electronic media programs.
The Florida Supreme Court concluded "that on balance there
was more to be gained than lost by permitting electronic media
coverage of judicial proceedings subject to standards for such cov-
erage. '79 The court was of the opinion that, because of the judici-
ary's significant role in the day-to-day lives of the citizenry, it was
imperative that the populace have confidence in the process.8 0 It
thought that broadcast coverage of trials would aid the public in
accepting and understanding court decisions.8' The Florida court
then amended Canon 3A(7) to allow television in the courtroom. 8 2
75. This was the result of the Post-Newsweek Stations of Florida petitioning
the Supreme Court of Florida urging a change in Florida's Canon 3A(7) electronic
media prohibition. Petition of the Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 327 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1976).
76. Those guidelines can be found in Petition of the Post-Newsweek Stations,
Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 792 (1979). See note 78 infra.
77. See note 22 supra.
78. Petition of the Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 347 So. 2d 402 (Fla.
1976). A copy of the pilot-program standards can be found as an Appendix to Peti-
tion of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 783 (Fla. 1979).
79. Id. at 780.
80. Id.
81. In writing for the Court, Justice Sandberg reasoned:
In reaching our conclusion we are not unmindful of the perceived risks
articulated by the opponents of change. However, there are risks in any
system of free and open government. A democratic system of government
is not the safest form of government, it is just the best man has devised to
date, and it works best when its citizens are informed about its workings.
Id. at 781.
82. Id. The canon now provides:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control
the conduct of proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and pre-
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It was this revision that prompted two criminal defendants to
challenge the constitutional validity of television coverage of their
trial and ultimately gave the United States Supreme Court an op-
portunity to clarify and review its position in Estes.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1977, Noel Chandler and Robert Granger, appellants, were
charged with conspiracy to commit burglary, grand larceny and
possession of burglary tools.83 What made this case more than a
conventional burglary was that, at the time of their arrest, appel-
lants were Miami Beach policemen. The state's leading witness84
was an amateur radio operator, who unintentionally overheard
and recorded incriminating conversation between appellants over
their police field radios during the burglary. Predictably, the
unique attributes of the case attracted the attention of the media.
Appellants sought, by pretrial motion, to have Experimental
Canon 3A(7)85 declared unconstitutional on its face and as ap-
plied.86 Although the trial court denied relief,8 7 it certified the is-
sue to the Florida Supreme Court.8 8 The Florida Supreme Court,
nevertheless, declined to rule on the matter based on the fact that
it was not directly relevant to the criminal charges against the ap-
pellants. 89 Although appellants persisted with several other at-
tempts to prevent electronic media coverage of the trial, none
were successful.
At voir dire, counsel for appellants questioned each prospective
juror as to whether he or she could be impartial and fair, notwith-
standing the presence of a television camera during the trial.
vent distractions, and (ii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the
pending cause, electronic media and still photography coverage of public
judicial proceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be
allowed in accordance with standards of conduct and technology promul-
gated by the Supreme Court of Florida.
Id.
83. Appellants had attempted to burglarize a well known Miami Beach restau-
rant. Id. at 806.
84. The witness's name was John Sion.
85. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
86. Appellants alleged that television coverage of this proceeding denied them
a fair and impartial trial.
87. 101 S. Ct. 802, 806 (1981).
88. See note 82 supra, which states that the Florida Supreme Court retains su-
pervisory power over the trial court's implementation of electronic media coverage
of its proceedings.
89. State v. Granger, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1977).
Each juror actually selected for the case responded that such cov-
erage would not affect his or her consideration in any way.90
The trial judge denied a defense motion to sequester the jury.91
The court did, however, instruct the jury not to watch or read any
sort of media coverage of the case and suggested that jurors limit
their television news exposure to only that of national scope. Ap-
pellants' counsel then requested that the witnesses be instructed
not to watch any television coverage of testimony presented at
trial. The court refused this instruction, reasoning that no wit-
ness testimony was being reported on the evening news.92
During the trial, a television camera covered the state's presen-
tation of the radio operator's testimony and the closing argu-
ments. There was no television coverage of any part of the case
for the defense.93 With the exception of one minor incident,94
there was no evidence of any disruption or confusion caused by
the television camera's presence.
The jury found appellants guilty on all counts. As a conse-
quence, appellants moved for a new trial, asserting that they had
been denied a fair and impartial trial as a result of the television
coverage. Appellants made no showing or allegation of specific
prejudice.
Upon affirming the convictions, 95 the Florida District Court of
Appeal declined to address the facial validity of Canon 3A(7).
The court reasoned that the Florida Supreme Court, having deter-
mined to allow an experimental program for television coverage,
had implicitly decided that such coverage did not violate the fed-
eral or state constitutions. The district court of appeal did, how-
ever, agree to certify the question of the facial constitutionality of
Canon 3A(7) to the Florida Supreme Court.96
The Florida Supreme Court denied review97 because of its hold-
90. 101 S. Ct. 802, 806 (1981). Interestingly, a television camera recorded the
voir dire.
91. Id. C.f. Estes, wherein the Texas jurors were sequestered. See TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 35.23 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 609 (1965) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
92. 101 S. Ct. at 806.
93. Id. In total, only two minutes and fifty-five seconds of trial were broadcast,
and, of that, only the prosecution's side of the case was shown.
94. Id. at 806 n.7. During a part of the testimony of the state's key witness,
John Sion, the judge interrupted the questioning to instruct a cameraman to stop
a certain movement that the judge apparently found distracting.
95. Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
96. It's worthy to note that the district court of appeal found no evidence in
the trial transcript to indicate that the presence of a television camera had hin-
dered appellants in presenting their case or had deprived them of an impartial
jury. Id. at 69.
97. Chandler v. State, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979) (actually finding the issue
moot).
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ing, in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc.,98 that televi-
sion coverage of courtroom proceedings was not per se a denial of
due process. The Chandler case was then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, 99 which subsequently affirmed the judg-
ment of the Florida Court 0 0 and signaled to other states that a
program permitting radio, television and photographic coverage of
criminal proceedings, over the accused's objection, is constitu-
tional, absent a showing of specific prejudice.
IV. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS
The Chandler CourtlOl initiated its analysis with a discussion of
the Florida Supreme Court's explicit rejection of any state or fed-
eral constitutional right of access by the electronic media to cover
a trial and, thereafter, broadcast the proceedings. 0 2 In making its
rejection, the Florida court relied on Nixon v. Warner Communi-
cations, Inc. ,103 where the Court held:
In the first place, . .. there is no constitutional right to have [live wit-
ness] testimony recorded and broadcast. [citation omitted]. Second,
while the guarantee of a public trial, in the words of Justice Black, is "a
safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of per-
secution," [citation omitted] it confers no special benefit on the press. [ci-
tation omitted]. Nor does the Sixth Amendment require that the trial-or
any part of it-be broadcast live or on tape to the public. The requirement
of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public
and the press to attend the trial and report what they have observed. 104
The Court tacitly affirmed this earlier holding in Nixon l0 with-
out discussion and utilized the Florida court's interpretation of
and reliance on Nixon to narrow the issue before them. The
98. 370 So. 2d at 782.
99. 100 S. Ct. 1832 (1980) (probable jurisdiction noted).
100. 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981).
101. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Associ-
ate Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justices
Stewart and White wrote separate concurrences. Justice Stevens did not
participate.
102. 101 S. Ct. at 807. The Florida Supreme Court made this judgment while
promulgating the revised Canon 3A(7), and it framed its holding as follows:
While we have concluded that the due process clause does not prohibit
electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings per se, by the same to-
ken we reject the argument of the [Post-Newsweek Stations] that the first
and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution mandate entry of
the electronic media into judicial proceedings.
Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d at 774.
103. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
104. Id. at 610.
105. Id.
Court stated that "the Florida Supreme Court predicated the re-
vised Canon 3A(7) upon its supervisory authority over the Florida
courts, and not upon any constitutional imperative .. . [ there-
fore] only the limited question of the Florida Supreme Court's au-
thority to promulgate the canon for the trial of cases in Florida
courts" 0 6 is to be decided. The Court continued: "this Court has
no supervisory jurisdiction over state courts, and, in reviewing a
state court judgment, we are confined to evaluating it in relation
to the Federal Constitution." 0 7 Thus, the Chandler Court, by rec-
ognizing a state court's utilization of Supreme Court precedent, 0 8
side-stepped any confrontation with the first amendment rights of
the electronic media. 109
A. The Meaning of Estes
The Court directed its attention to the opinion1'0 in Estes which
appellants argued announced a per se constitutional rule that tel-
evising criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process. The
Court acknowledged that Chief Justice Warren's concurrence,
which was joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, lent some
support to the appellants' position."' However, the Court empha-
106. 101 S. Ct. at 807.
107. Id.
108. Interestingly, the Nixon majority relied on Estes to support the conclusion
that "there is no constitutional right to have testimony recorded and broadcast."
435 U.S. at 610. However, the reliance on Estes was unjustified since Estes did not
decide that there was no first amendment right to record trials. Instead, that case
held merely that recording would not be permitted when it threatened a defend-
ant's right to due process of law. Thus, the questionable use of precedent can ar-
guably be viewed as permeating at least the framing of the issue in Chandler.
109. This author acknowledges the fact that the petitioner's herein only allege
the media's coverage deprived them of a fair trial; at the same time, the first
amendment issue has, in the mind of many scholars, been so intertwined with the
right to a fair trial that more attention by the Court to the free press issue would
have been expected.
For example, recently, an author, discussing the many state courts allowing
electronic media coverage of trials, wrote that ultimately the issue will confront
the United States Supreme Court, "giving the Court the opportunity to review
both the validity of its position in Estes and the first amendment issues it failed to
address in that case." Zimmerman, supra note 3 at 646. Unfortunately, the au-
thor's prediction was correct only as to the former.
For an excellent discussion of the first amendment issues regarding technologi-
cal access to the courtroom, case history, and a proposed analysis for the Court,
see Zimmerman, supra note 3.
The Court has in the past made assumptions for the sake of argument when it
felt discussion was necessary to clarify confusion. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S.. at 610.
110. Appellants relied chiefly on Justice Clark's opinion for the majority and
Chief Justice Warren's separate concurring opinion. See notes 49-65 supra and ac-
companying text.
111. 101 S. Ct. at 807. "If appellants' reading of Estes were correct, we would be
obliged to apply that holding and reverse the judgment under review." Id.
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sized that Estes was a plurality decision with Justice Harlan pro-
viding the fifth vote necessary in support of the judgment. This
prompted the Court to examine and dissect Justice Harlan's opin-
ion, so as to make a determination of the ultimate holding in Es-
tes, thereby deciding whether a per se rule was in fact established
by the Estes Court.
Chief Justice Burger opened this analysis with an observation
made by Justice Harlan in Estes.
Permitting television in the courtroom undeniably has mischievous poten-
tialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere which should always
surround the judicial process. Forbidding this innovation [referring to tel-
evision in courtrooms], however, would doubtless impinge upon one of the
valued attributes of our federalism by preventing the states from pursuing
a novel course of procedural experimentation. My conclusion is that there
is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in the court-
room, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the
considerations against allowing television in the courtroom so far out-
weigh the countervailing factors advanced in its support as to require a
holding that what was done in this case infringed the fundamental right to
a fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1 12
The Court then took notice of Justice Harlan's synthesis of what
he conceived to be the inherent dangers of televised trials.1 3 The
Chief Justice doubted "how much of Justice Clark's opinion was
joined in, and supported by Justice Harlan."114 However, Chief
Justice Burger expressed understanding in the apparent indeci-
siveness of the Estes Court by stating: "In an area charged with
constitutional nuances, perhaps more should not be expected."115
The Court, in reaching its conclusion as to the meaning of the
Estes decision, pronounced that "Justice Harlan's opinion ...
must be read as defining the scope of that holding [referring to
Estes]; we conclude that Estes is not to be read as announcing a
constitutional rule barring still photographic, radio and television
coverage in all cases and under all circumstances."1 6 The Court
112. Id. at 807-08 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 587 (Harlan J., concurring)).
113. 101 S. Ct. at 808. See 381 U.S. at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring). The list that
Justice Harlan presented was much the same as this article revealed in the back-
ground discussion. See notes 52-69 supra and accompanying text.
114. 101 S. Ct. at 808.
115. Id. at 808-09.
116. Id. at 809. To support this proposition, the Court cited its subsequent
cases which have so read Estes. Those cases were: Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 352 (1966), where Estes was cited as an instance where "the totality of the cir-
cumstances" led to a denial of due process; Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798
(1975), in which the Court described Estes as "a state court conviction obtained in
the trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage;" Nebraska
determined that Estes "does not stand as an absolute ban on state
experimentation with an evolving technology, which, in terms of
modes of mass communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964,
and is, even now, in a state of continuing change.""l 7
Notwithstanding this rather strong language, the Court recog-
nized in a footnote that Justice Harlan's opinion "sounded a note"
that broadcast coverage inherently violates the Due Process
Clause. 18 However, this was quickly countered by other lan-
guage in the Harlan opinion that supported the Chandler Court's
view.119 Thus, the Chief Justice wrote: 'There is no need to 'over-
rule' a 'holding' never made by the Court."120
Although the Court refrained from using any incisive analysis
in reaching this conclusion, it did select those portions of the
Harlan opinion which best supported its proposition to dis-
tinguish Estes from this case. However, a careful reading of Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion leaves the reader with no definitive
answer.121 It is readily apparent that whether a narrow or broad
reading of Estes (more particularly the Harlan opinion) is
adopted, the holdings will vary. This Court opted for a narrow
reading, thereby avoiding a disavowal of the Estes decision.
B. Formulating a Rule
When the Court became satisfied that Estes did not proclaim a
constitutional rule prohibiting all electronic media coverage of
criminal trials, the Court directed itself, as a matter of first im-
pression,122 to the appellants' recommendation that it formulate
Free Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 552 (1975), in which the Estes trial was de-
picted as lacking due process where "the volume of trial publicity, the judge's fail-
ure to control the proceeding, and the telecast of a hearing and of the the trial
itself' prevented a sober search for the truth. Id. at 809 n.8.
117. Id. at 809. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
118. Id. at 809 n.8.
119. The Court was particularly convinced when Justice Harlan concluded his
opinion by stating, "the day may come when television will have become so com-
monplace an affair in the daily life of the average person ... that its use in court-
rooms may disparage the judicial process." 381 U.S. at 595 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Such language made it clear that no per se rule existed.
120. 101 S. Ct. at 809 n.8.
121. As Justice Stewart aptly points out, Justice Harlan "limited his opinion' to
... notorious criminal trial[s] such as the one in [EstesI ... ,'" but at the same
time admitted that there may be no practical distinctions that can be drawn based
on the type of case. 101 S. Ct. at 815 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Chandler
Court, notwithstanding the arguable conflicts in the Harlan opinion, treated its
conclusion as apparent, that is, as pointed out by Justices Stewart and White in
each concurrence, frought with difficulty.
122. Although the Court stated that deciding whether a per se rule should be
adopted was one of first impression for this Court, the question is hardly a new
one. The Estes Court fully discussed the propriety of a constitutional rule
throughout its six opinions, notwithstanding the lack of a specific request by the
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such a per se rule. 123 In so doing, the Court prefaced its discus-
sion with the notion that a great deal of publicity in a criminal
case may impair the defendant's right to a fair trial.124 Notwith-
standing this fact, the Court took notice of the various curative
devices the courts have adopted to secure unprejudiced jury de-
liberations.125 The Chief Justice then established a precept which
served as a directive for the Court to expand upon. He stated:
"[A]n absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials
cannot be justified simply because there is a danger that, in some
cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial and trial events
may impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or in-
nocence uninfluenced by extraneous matter."126 This risk, the
Court felt, is safeguarded by the fact that a defendant has the
right to demonstrate on appeal that the media's coverage of his
case compromised the ability of the jurors to adjudicate fairly. 2 7
In other words, the defendant is placed with the burden of show-
ing that his case was prejudiced.l28 Acknowledging that the
appellant. See 381 U.S. at 552 (Warren, C.J., concurring), where Chief Justice War-
ren wrote "I join the Court's opinion and agree that the televising of criminal trials
is inherently a denial of due process .... See also id. at 601, 615 (Stewart J., dis-
senting); id. at 615 (White, J., dissenting).
123. 101 S. Ct. at 809.
124. Id. See, e.g., Nebraska Free Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1975).
125. The Court cited Nebraska Free Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-65
(1975), wherein the opinion catalogued a variety of protective precautions to avoid
biased jury deliberations. Some of those were a change of venue, postponement of
trial to allow public attention to subside, extensive voir dire, clear instructions to
jurors and sequestration.
126. 101 S. Ct. at 810.
127. Id. at 813.
128. Id. at 810. In dicta, the Court noted that: "[Tihe risk of juror prejudice in
some cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the
printed media; so also the risk of such prejudice does not warrant an absolute con-
stitutional ban on all broadcast coverage." Id. at 810. However, it is argued that
there has existed and continues to exist a definite judicially viewed disparity be-
tween the first amendment rights of the print media and that of the broadcast me-
dia. "Legislators and government administrators have, with Court approval,
exerted control over the content and operations of the broadcast media that would
be unthinkable if applied to the print media." Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 642.
For a discussion of the treatment of print versus broadcast media, see, e.g., B.
SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC ACCESs (1976); Bollinger, Freedom of
the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass
Media, 75 MICH. L REV. 1 (1976); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First
Amendment, 10 J. LAW. & ECON. 15 (1967).
For cases arguably enforcing a double standard, see F.C.C. v. Paciflca Founda-
tion, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh. den., 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (holding 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976),
which prohibits the broadcasting of "obscene, indecent, or profane language", con-
stitutional as applied to the particular facts of the case); Red Lion Broadcasting
number of appeals may likely increase because of the creation of
a new ground for reversal, without expansion, the Court said this
is a risk Florida has opted to bear.129
In confronting the concern that the presence of media cameras
and recording devices at trial would inevitably give rise to ad-
verse psychological impact on the participants in the trial, the
Court said that, at this time "there is no unimpeachable empirical
support for the thesis that the presence of the electronic media,
ipso facto, interferes with trial proceedings."130 The Court did,
however, mention that if data were to demonstrate that electronic
media coverage of trials "invariably and uniformly"131 had an ad-
verse impact on the conduct of participants, so as to impair funda-
mental fairness, the decision would be easy: "prohibition of
broadcast coverage of trials would be required."132
The Chandler Court also emphasized that the Florida rule
harbors safeguards to protect against the potential for prejudice
by requiring that objections to coverage by the accused be heard
and considered on the record by the trial judge.133 Consequently,
there would be a transcript for appellate review. 34 But it ap-
peared more important to the Court that a pretrial hearing would
allow a defendant to demonstrate factually the basis of this objec-
tion to broadcast coverage, thereby enabling the trial court to take
measures necessary to reduce or eradicate the risks of prejudice
to the accused1 35
Content that unfavorable ramifications to trial participants were
not inherently attached to electronic coverage of trials, so as to
deny an accused due process, and that formulated safeguards
served to protect against any adverse impacts, the majority pro-
Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (where the Supreme Court allowed major govern-
mental intrusions into editorial control of the content of radio and television pro-
gramming). But cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), reh den., 414 U.S. 881
(1973); Memoris v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), which exemplify the print media's enjoyment of a broader freedom
to be indecent.
129. 101 S. Ct. at 811.
130. Id. at 810 n.11.
131. Id. at 810.
132. Id. See note 178 infra and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 811. The petitioners herein made no request for an evidentiary hear-
ing to show adverse impact or injury.
Although the Court made no mention, it could be argued that pretrial hearing
allowing the accused an opportunity to demonstrate that broadcast coverage ad-
versely impacts his trial would be but a hallow formality. For if, as acknowledged
by the Court, id. at 810 n.11, there is to date no empirical data which demonstrates
electronic media coverage taints a trial, how shall a defendant make proof of such
prejudice? See Green v. State, 377 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
134. 101 S. Ct. at 811.
135. Id.
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ceeded to formulate a directive to foster state experimentation in
this area. Serving as an analytical platform, the Chandler Court
quoted the following admonition of Justice Brandeis.
'To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave respon-
sibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experi-
ment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground
that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasona-
ble .... But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our
guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide
by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.'
1 3 6
Even though aware of all the alleged "mischievous potentiali-
ties"137 of broadcast coverage that could deny the accused due
process of law, the Court was still convinced that the appellants
had to prove specific injury because of the cameras' presence.138
No injuries were proved, and this was lethal to the particular ap-
pellant's (Chandler) claim herein.139
In reaching its conclusion, the Court felt uncompelled to ignore
or minimize "the potential danger to the fairness of a trial in a
particular case in order to conclude that Florida may permit the
electronic media to cover trials in its state courts."' 40 Simply put,
the Court found no equivalently constitutional prohibition and de-
cided "the states must be free to experiment,"14 1 as Florida had
done with the program authorized by Canon 3A(7). The majority
136. 101 S. Ct. at 812 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
137. 381 U.S. at 587. See notes 52-56, 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
138. 101 S. Ct. at 813. The Court said: "appellants have offered no evidence that
any participant in this case was affected by the presence of cameras. In short,
there is no showing that the trial was compromised by television coverage, as was
the case in Estes." 381 U.S. at 587.
However, a look at Estes reveals that Justice Clark explicitly said "this Court it-
self has found instances in which a showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequi-
site to reversal. This is such a case." 381 U.S. at 542.
The Chandler majority should have been more precise in its discussion of pre-
sumptive prejudice, for it was subsequent to the Estes decision that the Court em-
ployed a stricter standard for measuring press prejudice. In Murphy v. Florida,
421 U.S. 794 (1975), the Court held juror awareness of the trial's notoriety was not
enough to trigger a finding of presumptive prejudice, for cases after Murphy, see
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 59-71 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
933 (1977); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977).
139. 101 S. Ct. at 813.
140. Id.
141. Id.
continued: "We are not empowered by the Constitution to over-
see or harness state procedural experimentation; only when the
state action infringes fundamental guarantees are we authorized
to intervene."142 However, the Court remained clearly uncommit-
ted to state its position on the issue when it said, "there is no rea-
son for this Court either to endorse or to invalidate Florida's
experiment," unless there is a showing of actual prejudice of con-
stitutional dimensions to these defendants.143
Notwithstanding this reticence, Chief Justice Burger has said
he would not allow a television camera in his courtroom.'" As to
the meaning of Chandler, the Chief Justice was quoted as saying
that the decision was in the area of states rights. "'The central
point of that decision is the recognition that the United States
Supreme Court is not a supervisor of state courts. Our jurisdic-
tion begins only when some action transgresses the Constitu-
tion.' "145 Thus, it was the concept of federalism that actually
guided the majority in reachings its decision.146
V. THE CONCURRENCES
A. Justice Stewart: Concurring in the Result
Justice Stewart refused to join the opinion of the majority be-
cause he felt the convictions in the case could not be affirmed
without overruling Estes v. Texas. 47 He believed Estes estab-
lished a per se rule prohibiting all electronic media from state
courtrooms whenever a criminal trial was in progress. In fact, the
Justice dissented in Estes for that very reason. 48 Justice Stewart
pointedly criticized the Chandler opinion by stating: "rather than
join what seems to me a wholly unsuccessful effort to distinguish
that decision, I would now flatly overrule it.'1 49
Justice Stewart reasoned that the factual scenerio in Estes was
not much unlike that in Chandler. In Estes, all television and
newsreel photographers were restricted to a booth, specially con-
structed in the back of the courtroom. Only a limited portion of
the trial was permitted to be telecast. 50 Thus, Justice Stewart
could not perceive the lack of physical disruption as the distin-
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Winter, Cameras in the Courtroom, 67 A.B.AJ. 277, (1981).
145. Id.
146. 101 S. Ct. at 812.
147. 381 U.S. 532 (1964). See 101 S. Ct. at 814 (Stewart, J., concurring).
148. 381 U.S. at 601 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
149. i01 S. Ct. at 814 (Stewart, J., concurring).
150. 381 U.S. at 537. In fact, only the opening and closing arguments of the
State and the return and receipt of the jury's verdict were carried live with sound.
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guishing factor in Chandler.l5'
Rather, in Estes, Justice Stewart felt that "The violation inhered
... in the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and re-
cording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prej-
udicial to the accused."'152 This he closely scrutinized by noting
that the Estes jurors "were sequestered day and night, from the
first day of the trial until it ended."53 In Chandler, Justice Stew-
art noted that the jurors were not sequestered at all. This aspect
alone, he said, made the Estes decision an even easier one than
Chandler to find no substantial threat to a fair trial. 54
In further dissecting the Chandler majority's use of precedent,
he questioned the majority's reliance upon Justice Harlan's con-
currence in Estes because he recognized that the majority began
its opinion by noting that Justice Harlan limited his opinion "to a
notorious criminal trial such as the one in [Estes] ."15 Justice
Stewart aptly pointed out that the majority in Chandler labeled
the Chandler trial as notorious by use of the following language:
"several aspects of the case distinguish it from a routine burglary
.... Not surprisingly, these novel factors attracted the attention
of the media."156 Thus, Justice Stewart believed the majority's at-
tempt to factually distinguish Estes from Chandler was tenuous at
best.
In concluding, Justice Stewart said that the Estes Court "found
the admittedly unobtrusive presence of television cameras in a
criminal trial to be inherently prejudicial, and thus violative of
Due Process of Law."1 5 7 He then explicitly stated that the Chan-
dler majority reached "precisely the opposite conclusion"158 and
disapproved "the square departure from precedent."l5 9
The trial judge, at the defendant's request, prohibited coverage of defense counsel
during their summation to the jury. Id.
Even Justice Harlan, upon whose opinion the majority relied heavily, called the
Estes coverage "relatively unobtrusive, with the cameras contained in a booth at
the back of the courtroom." Id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring).
151. 101 S. Ct. at 814 (Stewart, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 814-15.
153. Id. at 815 n.1 (Stewart, J., concurring).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 815 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion, 101 S. Ct. at
808).
156. Id. at 806.
157. Id. at 815 (Stewart, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
B. Justice White: Concurring in the Judgment
Agreeing with the reasons advanced in Justice Stewart's con-
currence, Justice White was of the opinion that "Estes is fairly
read as establishing a per se constitutional rule against televising
any criminal trial if the defendant objects."160 As a result, he pro-
nounced that Estes must be overruled to affirm the Chandler
judgment below. 161
Justice White acknowledged, however, that Estes could argua-
bly be read more narrowly because of Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion, which called for the prohibition of electronic media cov-
erage of only widely publicized, notorious criminal trials.
Notwithstanding this possibility, Justice White believed that
whatever the reading of Estes, broad or narrow, the decision
should have been overruled by the Chandler Court.162
Justice White, like Justice Stewart, was in the dissent in Estes
and wrote that he remained "unwilling to assume or conclude
without more proof than has been marshalled to date that televis-
ing criminal trials is inherently prejudicial even when carried out
under properly controlled conditions."163 Thus, as to this portion
of the Chief Justice's opinion in Chandler, Justice White
agrees. 164
However, Justice White disapproved of the Chandler Court's re-
liance on and interpretation of Justice Harlan's opinion in Es-
tes.165 For example, Justice White proficiently pointed out that
the Florida rule has no exception for the sensational or widely
publicized case on which Justice Harlan explicitly limited his con-
currence. 166 This he argued is such a departure from Estes that it
"effectively eviscerates" 67 that case. Thus, he concluded not
even the narrower reading of Estes, which the Chandler majority
adopted, would have precedential value.1 6 8
Furthermore, Justice White believed that a defendant should be
required to show some specific prejudice to his or her defense,
and, without so doing, a state court decision to allow television






166. Id. See 381 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Florida program pro-
vides that any kind of case may be televised, absent a showing of specific
prejudice, as long as the rule is otherwise complied with. Petition of Post-News-
week Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d at 774 (Fla. 1979).
167. 101 S. Ct. at 816 (White, J., concurring).
168. Id.
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coverage should not be overturned. 169 It was with this issue that
Justice White had further difficulty in reconciling the Chandler
majority with that of Estes. He reiterated that the Chandler opin-
ion construed Estes as merely announcing that, on the facts of
that case, there had been an unfair trial, and no per se rule was
established at all. Justice White articulated that this was directly
in conflict with the various Estes opinions. As an example, he
cited Justice Clark's majority opinion, which said "that no 'isolat-
able' or 'actual' prejudice had been or need be shown ... ,"170 In
addition, Justice White noted that Justice Harlan explicitly re-
jected the requirement of showing "'specific prejudice' in cases
'like this one.' "171 Justice White then focused on the Chandler
rule which stated that "'absent a showing of prejudice of consti-
tutional dimensions to these defendants,' there is no reason to
overturn the Florida rule. ... ,"172
Justice White viewed these inconsistencies as reducing "Estes
to an admonition to proceed with some caution."17 3 He aptly con-
cluded that the Chandler decision does nothing that the Estes
Court did not already do.174 In other words, since the majority
had decided Estes never in fact established a constitutional prohi-
bition to electronic coverage of trials, it followed that it had been
just as permissible pre-Chandler, as it is currently, for a state to
permit television coverage of its trials over the defendant's
objection.
VI. IMPACT OF THE CASE
The unanimous Chandler decision clearly shows that the fed-
eral constitution does not mandate a prohibition of electronic me-
dia coverage of state courtroom proceedings. This decision is,
beyond doubt, an important one, for it uncontestably establishes
strong precedent which will serve to offer the states guidance in
deciding whether to implement a program allowing television cov-
erage of its trials. 175 It is not the result of the Chandler decision
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 817 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 593
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
172. Id. (quoting 101 S. Ct. at 813).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Certainly many states which currently permit television coverage of trials
on an experimental basis, see note 74 supra, will consider the Chandler opinion
that disturbs this author; rather, it is the way the decision was
reached. Before discussing the Court's method of reaching its de-
cision, it is necessary to disclose exactly what the Chandler case
does denote and what the probable practical ramifications will be.
Concisely stated, Chandler v. Florida held that television cam-
eras in state courtrooms is not inherently unconstitutional with
regard to the defendant.176 Electronic media coverage of a crimi-
nal trial does not per se violate a defendant's due process right to
a fair trial. The result of such a holding directly places the bur-
den on the defendant of proving that actual prejudice resulted (in
the case of an appeal) or will result (in the case of a pretrial chal-
lenge to electronic coverage) because of the electronic media's
presence in the courtroom. 177 The Court further required that
this showing be with specificity. For example, Chief Justice Bur-
ger wrote in Chandler: "To demonstrate prejudice in a specific
case a defendant must show something more than juror aware-
ness that the trial is such as to attract the attention of broadcast-
ers."178 By negative implication, Chandler sets a high standard
by requiring a near scientific showing by a defendant that the
presence of cameras will prejudice his case.179 "Yet the bottom
line to date remains, as the U.S. Supreme Court said in Chandler,
'at present no one has presented empirical data sufficient to es-
tablish that the mere presence of broadcast media in the court-
room inherently has an adverse effect on the process under all
circumstances.' "180 Therefore, it is doubtful that a defendant will
have success in attaining an equal showing of prejudice, unless
the circumstances are extremely unique.181
when deciding whether to adopt permanently a program such as Florida's. It is
also likely that those states which have refrained from experimenting with elec-
tronic media covered trials will reconsider that posture. It was said that "Chan-
dler does not require states to admit cameras into their courts, but.. . state laws
prohibiting televised coverage 'would invite a very strong constitutional chal-
lenge."' Winter, supra note 144 at 278 (quoting Stephan Nevas, First Amendment
counsel for the National Association of Broadcasters).
Curiously, after the Chandler decision, the Maryland House of Delegates voted
to prohibit cameras and tape recorders from criminal trials, notwithstanding a
state court of appeal's ruling which allowed an 18 month experiment with the tele-
vision coverage that began prior to the Chandler opinion. Winter, supra note 144
at 278.
176. 101 S. Ct. at 813-14.
177. Id. at 810-14.
178. Id. at 813.
179. Winter, supra note 144, at 278.
180. Id. (quoting from Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct. at 812).
181. As an example of an adequate showing, see Green v. State, 377 So. 2d 193
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), where it was held that upon showing that electronic me-
dia coverage of a trial would render an otherwise competent defendant incompe-
tent to stand trial, the trial court is constitutionally required to prohibit electronic
media coverage of such court proceedings.
[Vol. 9: 165, 1981] TV to the Courtroom
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Undoubtedly, there will be a considerable increase in pretrial
challenges because of television coverage. If at all possible, it
would seem logical that defense attorneys will attempt to protect
their clients from increased public exposure. Objections to cover-
age will need to be made at the trial level so as to preserve the
right to raise the issue on appeal. Further, as noted by the Chan-
dler Court, such coverage "may well increase the number of ap-
peals by adding a new basis for claims to reverse .... -182 In any
event, the Court has provided the legal community with a deci-
sion on the electronic media issue, and only actual implementa-
tion and time will fully reveal the practical repercussions.
As noted earlier, the approach the Chandler Court utilized in
attaining the basis for its decision is questionable. For as Justice
White enunciated in his concurring opinion, 8 3 the Chandler deci-
sion really did not change the law because the Court found its
opinion to be consistent with Estes v. Texas. The question is, con-
sistent with what?
In Estes, Justice Clark opted for a per se rule which required
prohibiting television from the courtroom 84 but limited that rul-
ing to "television in its present stage of development."185 This
qualification prompted Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices
Goldberg and Douglas, to separately concur and flatly mandate a
per se prohibition.186 Justice Harlan's concurrence stated that
"cases like this one [referring to trials of notoriety], possess such
capabilities for interfering with the even course of judicial process
that they are constitutionally banned."' 87 Further, Justice Stew-
art, with whom Justices Black, Brennan, and White joined, dis-
sented because they believed that Estes announced a per se rule
that the fourteenth amendment "prohibits all television cameras
from a state courtroom whenever a criminal trial is in
progress." 88
Nevertheless, the Chandler majority chose to gather from the
182. 101 S. Ct. at 811.
183. Id. at 817 (White, J., concurring).
184. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 542, 544, 550 (1965).
185. Id. at 551. See notes 49-58 supra and accompanying text.
186. Id. at 540-41 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See notes 59-65 supra and accom-
panying text.
187. Id. at 596 (Harlan, J., concurring). See notes 66-70 supra and accompany-
ing text.
188. Id. at 614 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See generally the concurrences of Jus-
tices Stewart and White in Chandler. 101 S. Ct. at 814-17.
Harlan concurrence in Estes every excerpt possible to support the
attempted proposition that Estes did not in fact establish a per se
rule prohibiting televised coverage of trials. 189 By so doing, the
Court found it unnecessary to overrule Estes.190 Because of these
inconsistencies, there is little difficulty for one finding the sepa-
rate concurrences of Justices Stewart and White to be particu-
larly more persuasive and the Chandler majority's attempt to
reconcile analytically the Estes and Chandler decision tenuous at
most.191
Setting this aside, it is inescapable that Chandler v. Florida
raised a series of questions that will certainly return to the Court
for answers. Most inevitable will be the broadcasters' assertion of
their first amendment right of courtroom access.19 2 This will be
most likely in those states which have, to date, refused to allow
electronic media into their courts. Further, it must be
remembered that if empirical data is gathered that shows the tel-
evision camera to have a peculiar, adverse psychological impact
on trial participants, the Chandler majority has already an-
nounced that it will bar the cameras' presence. 193
It remains to be seen whether the American Bar Association
will reverse its current position, in light of this decision, and ac-
189. See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 814-15 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 815-17 (White,
J., concurring), where both Justices dissected the Chandler majority's interpreta-
tion of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estes and pointedly referenced the blatant
inconsistencies in the Chandler Court's analysis.
190. Interestingly, since Justice Harlan limited his concurrence in Estes to tri-
als of great notoriety, 381 U.S. at 808 (Harlan, J., concurring), and the Chandler
majority tacitly labeled the Chandler case notorious, e.g., "not surprisingly the
novel factors [referring to the Chandler facts] attracted the attention of the me-
dia," 101 S. Ct. at 806, what could be the distinguishing factors? Justice Stewart
also pointed to this analytical shortcoming of the majority. Id. at 815 n.3 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
Further, as indicated by Justice White, "Justice Clark's majority opinion [in Es-
tes I .. expressly recognized that no 'isolatable' or 'actual' prejudice had been or
need be shown [381 U.S. at 542-43] and Justice Harlan expressly rejected the ne-
cessity of showing 'specific' prejudice in cases 'like this one [381 U.S. at 593
(Harlan, J., concurring)].'" 101 S. Ct. at 816-17 (White, J., concurring). Yet the
Chandler majority ruled that "[absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional di-
mension to those] . . . defendants" there is no reason to overturn the convictions
of the appellants. 101 S. Ct. at 813.
191. See generally notes 147-74 supra and accompanying text.
192. For a full discussion of this subject, see Zimmerman, supra note 3.
193. "If it could be demonstrated that the mere presence of photographic and
recording equipment ... invariably and uniformly affected the conduct of partici-
pants so as to impair fundamental fairness, our task would be simple; prohibition
of broadcast coverage of trials would be required." 101 S. Ct. at 810.
There is presently a study being conducted by a private research firm in Califor-
nia which is compiling data to measure the television camera's psychological im-
pact on trial proceedings and its participants. When completed, the findings will
be submitted to the California Judicial Council for review. See Winter, supra note
144.
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cept the cameras' courtroom presence. In addition to the A.B.A.,
the practicing trial attorney will need to readjust his attitude to-
ward the invisible courtroom audience, for it is unlikely the Court
will regress from the Chandler decision.1 94
VII. CONCLUSION
The Chandler Court will be remembered for bringing television
into the courthouse, even though the decision was not founded
upon anything other than ambiguous precedent. This is substan-
tiated because a considerable portion of the majority opinion, and
all of the two separate concurrences, were directed toward
searching for the current interpretation of Estes.
However, the Chandler case was much simpler than its even-
tual counterpart, which was alluded to by both the Estes and
Chandler Courts. That will be the continuing saga of the "fair
trial-free press issue." For it is destined that a trial judge, while
acting within his or her discretionary powers, will refuse the elec-
tronic media access to a sensational trial. The denial will argua-
bly not stem from the potential prejudice to a defendant, but
rather because of the judge's concern for eventual reversal in the
event electronic coverage disrupts or prejudices the trial. This
case will be closely akin to the Post-Newsweek case that was
before the Florida Supreme Court.195 At that point, the highest
court in the land may reassess the television issue in light of the
first amendment and be forced to produce a relatively firm and
understandable result. But for the present, the Court has let it be
known that the camera's eye is not constitutionally prohibited
from the criminal courtroom, unless the defendant can specifi-
cally show that it will prejudice his or her trial so as to constitute
a denial of due process of law.
ALLEN F. CAMp
194. This author has concluded that the Court will not change this decision
later because there are currently so many states either permanently or experi-
mentally implementing a program permitting electronic media coverage of trials.
See note 74 supra. Further, it should be remembered that Chandler was an 8-0
decision.
195. See Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (1979).

